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The Law at War: Counterinsurgency




In December 2006, the Department of the Army released Field
Manual 3-24 titled "Counterinsurgency," which is the first doctrinal
work on the subject set forth by the Army in twenty years. At the
time of the manual's release, the United States had been at war in
Iraq for more than three years, at the cost of the lives of over 2,400
U.S. servicemembers,' and approximately 151,000 Iraqi civilians. 2
The effort to create the new manual was led by then Lieutenant
General David H. Petraeus, who would have the opportunity to put
theory into practice when he assumed command of all Coalition
Forces in Iraq the month following the publication of the
counterinsurgency manual.
* The author is a Washington-based attorney and reserve Naval officer. B.A. &
B.M., University of Hartford (2002); B.A., Oxford University (2004); J.D., Yale Law
School (2007). All statements of fact, opinion, and analysis are those of the author
and do not reflect the official positions or views of any U.S. government agency.
Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S.
government authentication of information or endorsement of the author's views.
This article has been reviewed to prevent the disclosure of classified information.
1. Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center, Global War On
Terrorism - Operation Iraqi Freedom, http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/
CASUALTY/OIF-Total-by-month.pdf (last visited Oct. 27,2009).
2. Estimates of Iraqi casualties vary greatly from study to study. The number
quoted here includes deaths resulting from violence between March 2003 and June
2006, and is taken from the Iraqi Family Health Survey conducted by the Iraqi
Federal Ministry of Health in Baghdad, the Kurdistan Ministry of Planning, the
Kurdistan Ministry of Health, the Central Organization for Statistics and
Information Technology in Baghdad, and the World Health Organization. See
Hannah Fischer, Iraqi Civilian Death Estimates, CONG. REs. SERVICE, Aug. 27, 2008, at
3-5.
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Under General Petraeus' leadership, the war in Iraq took a
dramatic turn, with military casualties falling from a high of 764 in
2007 to 221 in 2008.3 Furthermore, General Petraeus testified to
Congress that by September 2007, civilian deaths had declined by
45% and deaths due to ethno-sectarian violence had declined by
55%.4 General Petraeus attributed these positive trends to a
multitude of factors, including tribal rejection of Al Qaeda in Al
Anbar province, and the growth of Iraqi Security Forces.5 However,
the primary focus of American military efforts were on the
employment of "counterinsurgency practices that underscore the
importance of units living among the people they are securing, and
accordingly, our forces have established dozens of joint security
stations and patrol bases manned by Coalition and Iraqi forces in
Baghdad and in other areas across Iraq."6 Such practices were
straight out of the counterinsurgency manual, and to the extent that
security gains may be attributed to them, they validate the efficacy
of the new U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine.
Against the backdrop of security gains loomed the December
31, 2008, expiration of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1790, which
provided the legal justification for the presence of American forces
in Iraq.7 Without the authority provided by the resolution, it was
questionable whether U.S. forces would be able to continue military
operations, including the detainment of Iraqi citizens, and whether
U.S. forces would be liable under Iraqi law for actions taken in the
line of duty.8 In short, it appeared that the costly gains made over
five years of fighting might evaporate on New Year's Day 2009 if no
new international legal agreement was reached, which would result
in the effective confinement of U.S. forces to their bases in Iraq.
Fortunately, a political consensus was eventually achieved
within the Iraqi Parliament, and as of January 1, 2009, United States
military forces in Iraq became subject to the provisions of the
3. Global War on Terrorism - Operation Iraqi Freedom, supra note 1.
4. Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq, Sept. 10-11, 2007, at 3 (testimony of
Gen. David H. Petraeus to Congress), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
pubs/pdfs/Petraeus-Testimony20070910.pdf.
5. Id. at 4-5.
6. Id. at 2.
7. S.C. Res. 1790, 3, S/RES/1790 (December 18, 2007).
8. Alissa J. Rubin, Iraq Inches Closer to Security Pact with U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
15, 2008, available at http:// www.nytimes.com/2008/10/16/world/middleeast/
16iraq.html?_r=1&scp6&sq=Security%2Agreement%20Iraq&st=cse.
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Bilateral Security Agreement (hereinafter, "BSA").9 Article 4 of the
BSA provides that all military operations "shall be conducted with
full respect for the Iraqi Constitution and laws of Iraq," and
proclaims that "[i]t is the duty of the United States Forces to respect
the laws, customs, and traditions of Iraq and applicable
international law." 10 Article 22 of the BSA outlines the process by
which the United States may detain individuals in Iraq, stating that
"[no detention or arrest may be carried out by the United States
Forces... except through an Iraqi decision issued in accordance
with Iraqi law and pursuant to Article 4."11 Under Iraqi criminal
procedure, "arrest or apprehension of a person is permitted only in
accordance with a warrant issued by a judge or court or in other
cases as stipulated by law."12 Furthermore, the BSA requires that
"[iln the event the United States Forces detain or arrest persons as
authorized by this Agreement or Iraqi law, such persons must be
handed over to competent Iraqi authorities within twenty-four
hours from the time of their detention or arrest."13
While the provisions of the BSA are (perhaps by design) vague,
some general observations about the effect of the agreement on the
conduct of military operations may be made, particularly with
regards to the targeting of specific insurgent actors. First, the BSA
requires that United States Forces obtain a warrant - or at least a
lawful Iraqi decision - before seeking to arrest Iraqi civilians,
meaning that military operations designed to target individuals
cannot be conducted unilaterally.14 Second, the BSA appears to
9. Campbell Robertson, Pact, Approved in Iraq, Sets Time for U.S. Pullout, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/17/world/
middleeast/17iraq.html.
10. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq
On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their
Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq, U.S.-Iraq., Nov. 17, 2008, art. 4,
§ 3, [hereinafter Withdrawal Agreement], available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/iraq/SESOFA.pdf.
11. Id. art. 22, § 1.
12. Law of Criminal Proceedings, § 2, 92 (1971) (Iraq), available at
law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IraqiCriminal ProcedureCode.pdf.
13. Withdrawal Agreement, supra note 10, art. 22, § 2.
14. It should be noted that the Security Agreement does hint at some degree of
flexibility on this issue. For example, Article 22, Section 5, requires that warrants be
obtained before United States Forces search private property, "except in the case of
actual combat operations conducted pursuant to Article 4." Correspondingly,
Article 4 requires only that military operations be conducted "with the agreement
of the Government of Iraq," see art. 4, § 2, and with "full respect for" - rather than
2010]
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preclude long-term detention of Iraqis by the United States, except
where requested by Iraqi authorities. 15 Taken together, these two
provisions appear to lock the United States into the use of Iraqi
criminal procedure for the apprehension and detention of
individuals targeted by the military. Such is unfamiliar territory for
military forces accustomed to operating under the relatively
permissive procedural requirements of the Law of Armed Conflict 16
and the U.S. Rules of Engagement,17 and as such, requires a
paradigm shift. For many military officials, the new requirements
represent a regrettable yet necessary restraint on U.S. operations.
The BSA is regrettable because it limits military commanders'
operational freedom, yet it is necessary if Iraq is to function as an
independent, sovereign nation.
As this article will show, however, participation in indigenous
legal institutions may provide new, albeit challenging, options for
achieving U.S. military objectives, and diplomatic agreements such
as the BSA should not necessarily be viewed as a hindrance. To
demonstrate this point, Section II will define the international legal
framework that governs the conduct of a counterinsurgency
campaign, and will provide an example of how prosecution of
indigenous criminal insurgent actors complicate operational
planning. Section III will discuss the legal, strategic, and tactical
benefits of a counterinsurgency force participating in indigenous
legal institutions while Section IV will highlight several difficulties
inherent in such a course of action, including challenges in the
introduction of intelligence information as criminal evidence, and
cultural influences on legal processes and counterinsurgency goals.
Finally, Section V will examine the potential for the use of
indigenous legal institutions in future counterinsurgency
campaigns, and the impediments that may undermine the
effectiveness of such efforts.
in accordance with - Iraqi law. See art. 4, § 3. Thus, it seems that the Security
Agreement envisions some military operations that may be conducted without
strict adherence to Iraqi criminal procedure. In any case, such operations must be
coordinated by the Joint Military Coordination Committee, and in the absence of
agreement in that venue, through the Joint Ministerial Committee. See art. 4 §, 2.
15. Withdrawal Agreement, supra note 10, art. 22, §§ 1, 3.
16. See generally DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR (Adam Roberts & Richard
Guelff eds., 3rd ed. 2000) (1982).
17. See JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S LEGAL CENTER & SCH., OPERATIONAL LAW
HANDBOOK 73-104 (Marie Anderson & Emily Zukauskas eds., 2008).
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II. The Law at War
Before proceeding, a few definitions are necessary. First,
although the counterinsurgency manual was written during the war
in Iraq (and many references are made in the work to that conflict),
it was intended as a general doctrine to be applied broadly for
planning, training, and operating purposes for any current or future
insurgency conflicts. Operating from that premise, this paper will
also draw on examples from the Iraqi conflict,18 and will assume
correspondingly that the U.S. military will be the counterinsurgency
force applying the principles herein proposed. 19 At the same time, it
is intended that the problems and recommendations made in this
paper be applicable to any conflict in which a military force applies
concepts of counterinsurgency.
Second, counterinsurgency operations are not merely (nor
mostly) about combat operations. Rather, a successful
counterinsurgency effort will seek to both eliminate the insurgent
threat, as well as the economic, political, and cultural conditions that
allow the insurgency to flourish. Thus, essential to the successful
defeat of an insurgency is the establishment of the rule of law.20
Such is a broad concept, however, and incorporates many diverse
goals, such as enforcing property rights, ensuring civil courts are
available for the resolution of private disputes, encouraging equality
before the law, and enhancing judicial and police professionalism.
With the two preceding premises in mind, this paper will be
narrower in scope, with focus on the use of indigenous law as an
instrument to achieve military targeting objectives within the
context of a broader counterinsurgency effort. Counterinsurgency
may be analogized to emergency medical treatment, with the first
step being to "stop the bleeding," where the goal is to "protect the
population, break the insurgents' initiative and momentum, and set
the conditions for further engagement." 2' The second step is
"inpatient care - recovery," where the goal is to "develop and
18. In particular, this paper is influenced by the author's own experiences
working with Special Operations Task Force West in Al Anbar province from
October 2008 to March 2009. The experiences of other units - particularly in other
areas of the country - may vary.
19. Indeed, the terms "counterinsurgency force" and "military" generally refer
to U.S. forces, unless otherwise indicated.
20. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, COUNTERINSURGENCY MANUAL, 1-1 (2006).
21. Id. at 5-2.
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build resident capability and capacity in the [host nation]
government and security forces." 22 The final step is "outpatient care
- movement to self-sufficiency," where counterinsurgency forces
strive to transition responsibility for [counterinsurgency] operations
to [host nation] leadership." 23
While the targeting of specific individuals is likely to be more of
a focus during the first step, the counterinsurgency force will need
to maintain a residual ability to target and detain insurgents
throughout the entire process, lest violence and intimidation
undermine gains made in host nation self-sufficiency. Furthermore,
as gains are made and host nation capabilities increase in the second
and third steps of counterinsurgency, the foreign counterinsurgency
force will need to tailor their operations to facilitate the seamless
transition of insurgent targeting from the foreign military to the
indigenous legal authorities. To this end, familiarity with and
utilization of the substance and procedure of domestic criminal law
is essential.
In practical application, criminal statutes and criminal
procedure are likely to be the primary laws employed in targeting
individuals. However, domestic, international and transnational
civil law could be used in theory as well. There is a subtle
distinction between the "law at war" and the "law of war." The law
of war encompasses a variety of international legal regimes,
including the Rules of Engagement and the Law of Armed Conflict
and Humanitarian Law. In a counterinsurgency, the laws of war
inform and shape the law at war, with international agreements
setting the general parameters of liability applicable to
counterinsurgency forces in the host nation's legal regimes.
Here, it bears noting that, depending on the form and
circumstances of a particular counterinsurgency effort, different
international laws may apply.24  Insurgencies and
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. As an initial matter, it must be noted that regardless of whether the
counterinsurgency is considered an international conflict, or a conflict of a non-
international character, many of the core principles of the Geneva Conventions
would be applicable, if only through Common Article 3. See INT'L COMM. OF THE
RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION, 34 (1994); see also
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629-30 (2006) (ruling that Common Article 3
applies to the conflict between the United States and A] Qaeda). However, because
Common Article 3 concerns itself primarily with the treatment of protected persons
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counterinsurgencies vary greatly, from internal struggles to
attempts by local insurgents to overthrow an occupying power. The
counterinsurgency manual contemplates a more specific type of
counterinsurgency: the active participation by U.S. forces in quelling
insurgencies in foreign countries through long-term cooperation
with host nation forces. 25 Any such long-term counterinsurgency
campaign by the U.S. military - with the attendant efforts to
transfer the power of effective government from the U.S. military to
the host nation - may be characterized by successive stages, with
the character of the effort varying widely from one period to the
next. In the early stages of such counterinsurgency campaigns, the
U.S. military, having achieved effective control of the territory in
question, will be subject to the Hague26 and Geneva Conventions 27
governing occupation. Indeed, on May 22, 2003, shortly following
President Bush's declaration that "major combat operations in Iraq"
against the Republican regime had ended,28 the United Nations
defined the United States and the United Kingdom as "occupying
powers" in Iraq and called upon the two powers to "contribute to
conditions of stability and security in Iraq." 29
Of course, the term "occupying power" has a specific definition
under the various international agreements that comprise the Law
of Armed Conflict,30 even if the definition is difficult to apply within
the context of a counterinsurgency. For example, the Fourth Hague
Convention states that "[tlerritory is considered occupied when it is
rather than the criminality of acts prior to capture, reference must be made to whole
text of the Geneva Conventions, as well other potentially applicable international
regimes.
25. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, supra note 20, at 1-134-1-136.
26. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Oct. 18, 1907, Annex, art. 42, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Convention
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land].
27. See Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention IV].
28. George Bush, President of the United States, Speech Aboard the USS
Abraham Lincoln (May 1, 2003), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
ac2/wp-dyn/A2627-2003May1.
29. S.C. Res. 1483, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).
30. The Law of Armed Conflict is comprised of, inter alia, the Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907, in addition to the four Geneva Conventions of 1864,
1906, 1929, and 1949, as well as the Additional Protocols of 1977 and 2005. See
generally DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 16.
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actually placed under the authority of the hostile army." 31
Furthermore, "occupation extends only to the territory where such
authority has been established and can be exercised." 32 At various
points during counterinsurgency, the degree of control that the
foreign military force exercises over specific territory may ebb and
flow, making such broad tests of occupational authority difficult to
apply. Moreover, these criteria of occupation were historically
linked with the concept of debellatio, which declared that territories
pried from the control of a fallen regime become the sovereign
property of the occupying power.33 As Eyal Benvenisti notes,
however, the modern concept of occupation, as exemplified by U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1483, only contemplates a temporary
term of authority by the foreign power over the occupied territories,
with sovereignty remaining with the occupied population. 34 Thus,
implicit in such a view of the law of occupation is that the rights and
responsibilities of the foreign power will change once the
indigenous government is able to resume the provision of public
services.
It is unclear, however, what international legal regime would
supplant the law of occupation in an ideal counterinsurgency
campaign. Here, the example of Iraq may not offer much in the way
of clarifying information. Security Council Resolution 1483 was
superseded by Resolution 1546, which authorized the multinational
force in Iraq to "take all necessary measures to contribute to the
maintenance of security and stability in Iraq," albeit in accordance
with the request for multinational forces made by the Prime
Minister of the newly formed sovereign Iraqi government. 35 In
endorsing the new government, Resolution 1546 explicitly stated
that the multinational occupation of Iraq would end with the
transfer of sovereignty on June 30, 2004.36 Thus, following the
transfer of sovereignty to Iraq, the United States and its allies found
themselves operating in a confusing legal environment: authorized
to conduct operations by both the international community and the
31. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra note
26.
32. Id.
33. EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION xi (Princeton
Univ. Press 2d ed., 2004) (1993).
34. Id.
35. S.C. Res. 1546, [ 10, S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004).
36. Id. preamble.
[Vol. 33:1
The Law at War
host nation, yet not explicitly subject to the traditional law of
occupation.
As the U.S. military transfers the role of governance to the host
nation, the question of the applicable international legal regime
becomes more complicated. On the one hand, the struggle may be
analogous to an international armed conflict governed by
International Humanitarian Law such as the Third 37 and Fourth
Geneva Conventions38 (as well as Protocol 1.39) On the other hand,
the conflict may be described as non-international in character,
where Protocol 1140 and the Common Articles apply.41 Finally, the
conflict may possibly be characterized as a peacekeeping operation
under United Nations Chapter VII authority.42 Determination of the
applicable law would likely hinge on the character of the combatant
parties. For example, should the insurgent organization be the
remaining elements of the supplanted regime, an argument could be
made that the conflict remains one between two state parties, thus
making the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions applicable.
Alternatively, where the insurgent group's claim of governmental
authority is tenuous or nonexistent, reference to International
Humanitarian Law (other than the Common Articles) would be
inappropriate.
Reference to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations
and Associated Personnel (hereinafter, "Safety Convention") offers
little clarification of the matter.43 That convention - addressing
concerns about attacks on peacekeeping forces - applies to those
37. Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III].
38. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 27.
39. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
40. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol
II), 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
41. See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supra note 37, art. 3.
42. U.N. Charter art. 42.
43. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, Dec.
9, 1994, 2051 U.N.T.S. 363, available at http://www.un.org/law/cod/safety.htm
[hereinafter Safety Convention]. The United States is a signatory, but has not
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operations "established by the competent organ of the United
Nations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
conducted under United Nations authority and control," where "the
operation is for the purpose of maintaining or restoring
international peace and security" or "where the Security Council or
the General Assembly has declared, for the purposes of this
Convention, that there exists an exceptional risk to the safety of the
personnel participating in the operation." 44 The Safety Convention
does not define what constitutes "establishment" by the United
Nations, nor does it explicitly state the meaning of United Nations
"authority and control." The question therefore remains whether
military operations initiated unilaterally or multilaterally under the
Article 51 right to individual and collective defense,45 yet is
subsequently endorsed by an organ of the United Nations (e.g., the
Security Council under Chapter VII authority "calling upon" the
United States and the United Kingdom to restore "conditions of
security and stability" in Iraq),46 would meet the threshold
requirement of "establishment" and U.N. control for application of
the Safety Convention. Alternatively, the Safety Convention states
that it,
shall not apply to a United Nations operation authorized by the
Security Council as an enforcement action under Chapter VII of
the Charter of the United Nations in which any of the personnel
are engaged as combatants against organized armed forces and to
which the law of international armed conflict applies.47
Thus, for counterinsurgency operations that evolve out of
traditional inter-State conflict (like the campaign in Iraq),
application of the Safety Convention is problematic. To the extent
that the insurgency retains any claims of representing a sovereign
government, and maintains organizational structures sufficient to
meet the requirements of the Geneva Conventions, the provisions of
the Safety Convention are inapplicable.
If, however, a conflict initially within the purview of the laws of
international armed conflict becomes subject to the Safety
Convention, military commanders may gain an invaluable practical
and political tool as attacks against the forces of the State party that
44. See Safety Convention, supra note 43, art. 1(c).
45. U.N. Charter art. 51.
46. See S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 29, preamble.
47. Safety Convention, supra note 43, art. 2(2).
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has assumed peacekeeping functions become criminal48 instead of
potentially permissible as actions of lawful combatants. 49 The
practical advantages of criminalization of insurgent acts will be
discussed below.50 On a strategic and political level, invocation of
the Safety Convention could demark an important milestone in a
counterinsurgency campaign. Such would be an international
exhortation that the insurgent forces may no longer cloak their
actions in the garb of statehood. Sovereignty would reside with the
population, who, represented by a new regime, may rightfully
prosecute violations of public order.
A changing international legal backdrop affects the rights and
responsibilities of both insurgent and counterinsurgent forces at any
given point of the conflict. Actions may be permissible in one
period yet proscribed in the next. In such an environment, a
counterinsurgency military commander may be tempted to
maximize the advantages of legal authorities permitted him in one
period before the advantages devolve. Yet, despite changes in
applicable international regimes, military goals of security for the
civilian population and transfer of military and police operations to
host nations remain the same. Unlike the applicable international
regime, the indigenous criminal law likely will not change. Thus, a
consistency of policy as well as an unchanging local legal
environment may dissuade the military commander from exploiting
the differences in applicable international law over time, and indeed
may recommend the adherence to more restrictive international
regimes earlier in the counterinsurgency effort. As will be shown
below, adaptation of military operations to criminal justice practices
48. Id. art. 9.
49. While the Third Geneva Convention states that prisoners of war may be
prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to
capture, see Geneva Convention III, supra note 37, art. 85, it is unlikely that most
acts of warfare could be prosecuted, since the official commentaries of the
International Committee of the Red Cross limits the categories of prior crimes to a)
crimes against peace, b) war crimes, and c) crimes against humanity, see INT'L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 24, at 419-22. See also Geneva Convention IV,
supra note 27, art. 68 ("Protected persons who commit an offence which is solely
intended to harm the Occupying Power, but which does not constitute an attempt
on the life or limb of members of the occupying forces or administration, nor a
grave collective danger, nor seriously damage the property of the occupying forces
or administration or the installations used by them, shall be liable to internment or
simple imprisonment, provided the duration of such internment or imprisonment
is proportionate to the offence committed.").
50. See infra Section II.
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may be challenging enough without having to alter military
operations to suit the then applicable international regime. Thus,
while the laws of war will figure prominently in a military
commander's decision-making process, this paper will focus on the
more limited question of how to adapt military operations to
indigenous criminal law.
A. The Law at War in Practice
In order to highlight the operational effects of moving to a
prosecution model, an example may be helpful. Consider the
information and planning challenges confronting a military
commander seeking to locate and detain an individual or group of
individuals suspected of insurgent activity. First, the commander
must gain sufficient intelligence on the targeted individual. In a
thesis written for the Naval Postgraduate School, Steven Marks,
Thomas Meer, and Matthew Nilson propose a model for gathering
information on who they term "persons of national interest"
(hereinafter, "PONI"). 51 In this model, intelligence analysts seek out
information on the identity of a PONI, build a social profile of the
individual in question, and identify the PONI's support network, in
order to help narrow down the location of the wanted individual.52
Once intelligence analysts achieve a degree of confidence
concerning the location of a wanted individual, the commander
must conduct a second assessment, to "determine [the target's]
military importance, priority of attack, scale of effort, and lethal or
nonlethal capabilities required to attain a specified effect." 53 In other
words, the military commander must determine whether he has the
means to successfully attack the target, and whether the risk is
worth the gain.54
51. Steven Marks, Thomas Meer, and Matthew Nilson, Manhunting: A
Methodology for Finding Persons of National Interest (June 2005) (unpublished
M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/
awc/awcgate/nps/manhunting-marks-jun05.pdf.
52. Id. at 60. There are two additional steps in the process, namely assessing the
abilities and limitations of the "hunter," and consideration of alternative
hypotheses. Id. These two steps have been omitted here, since the first is captured
in the CARVER process below, and the second may be viewed as an assessment of
the results of a process parallel to the first three steps.
53. JOINT PUBLICATION 3-05.1, JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONs, TASK FORCE
OPERATIONS, app. F, 1 (April 2007), available at www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/
newpubs/jp3_05_l.pdf.
54. There are various assessment models for making such a determination.
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Assuming that the operation is successful and that the target is
taken into custody, the traditional model has been to deliver the
captured target to detention. From there, the "manhunt" begins
anew, with information gained from the capture of the PONI
providing the intelligence leads for the next target.55 Of course,
throughout the entire process, secrecy is essential to the protection
of the methods and means of intelligence gathering. Secrecy also
provides the raiding forces the additional security of the element of
surprise, and prevents the escape of the targeted individual.
Now consider how this model changes when the goal of
prosecution is added. Again, the process begins with the collection
and assessment of information on the target. However, in addition
to the various criteria listed above, the commander must now
consider not only whether the target presents an actual or potential
threat to U.S. forces, but also whether the target has committed a
crime, and whether the intelligence presents sufficient evidence
admissible in a court of law to support a conviction. In addition to
weighing the value of the target relative to the risk of attempting
capture, the military commander must consider whether the
politically disruptive effects of a foreign military detaining an
individual will reduce the chances of that individual's prosecution
in an indigenous court. Furthermore, many of the precursors to
detention necessary in criminal justice systems - such as the arrest
warrant requirement - risk exposing the details of a pending
operation, thereby placing forces at risk, and alerting the target.
Once the detention operation has been conducted, the aim of
prosecution requires intelligence analysts to remain engaged in the
case of the captured individual. Instead of merely seeking
information from the detainee in order to develop future targets,
intelligence analysts must identify and fill evidentiary gaps. This
must be done while avoiding procedural errors that might result in
the dismissal of the criminal case, and protecting sources of
intelligence.
This simple example demonstrates how the adoption of a goal
Joint Publication 3-05.1 prescribes the CARVER method, which evaluates the
Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect, and Recognizability
of an intended target. Id. at app. F, 3.
55. See Saddam Capture Leads to Other Arrests, ASSOCIATED PRESS, December 15,
2003, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,105755,00.htn-l, for an
example of how the capture of one PONI can provides intelligence of value in
successive manhunts.
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of criminal prosecution drastically increases the complexity of
targeting persons of national interest. Furthermore, this change in
the conduct of military operations is but one of the numerous
challenges a military commander in a multifaceted
counterinsurgency campaign must face, as concerns of economic
development and cultural engagement likewise demand attention
and resources. Considering the complexity and uncertainty of the
effort as a whole, a lack of enthusiasm on the part of military
commanders to alter familiar methods of conducting combat
operations is understandable. Nonetheless, as the next section will
show, the benefits of embracing the law enforcement model may
significantly outweigh the costs of frustrations involved.
III. Why Use Law?
Despite the operational limitations and additional procedural
requirements listed above, the use of a prosecution model may
provide several benefits to the military commander. First and
foremost, efforts made by a foreign military to use and improve the
indigenous legal system may contribute to increased perceptions of
indigenous governmental legitimacy, which in turn is a primary
goal of counterinsurgency operations.5 6  As the U.S. Army
Counterinsurgency Field Manual states,
The presence of the rule of law is a major factor in assuring
voluntary acceptance of a government's authority and therefore
its legitimacy. A government's respect for preexisting and
impersonal legal rules can provide the key to gaining it
widespread, enduring societal support. Such government respect
for rules - ideally ones recorded in a constitution and in laws
adopted through a credible, democratic process - is the essence
of the rule of law. As such, it is a powerful potential tool for
counterinsurgents. 57
Thus, if the use of indigenous legal institutions by
counterinsurgency forces can help to strengthen the competence,
responsiveness, and integrity of those institutions in the eyes of the
local populace, the result may be that claims of governmental
ineffectiveness and corruption - the oft rallying cry of insurgent
forces - may have less salience.58
56. See DEPARMENT OF THE ARMY, supra note 20, at 1-21.
57. See id. at 1-22.
58. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, Introduction to the Symposium on Legitimacy and
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Of course, the ability of a foreign military to positively affect
local nationals' perceptions of the legitimacy of legal institutions is
dependent on the local populace's perception of the foreign power.
However, it is possible that the use of indigenous legal systems by a
foreign military may have mutually beneficial results, in that if
either party possesses a greater degree of credibility amongst the
indigenous population, the interaction between the two parties may
serve to transfer some of the credibility from one to the other. This
in turn may create a "feedback loop" of legitimacy from the local
legal institutions to the foreign military, and vice versa.59 For
example, implicit in the utilization of a country's legal institutions is
a demonstration of respect for the sovereignty of those institutions.
If those institutions reflect the values of the society they represent, a
willingness by a foreign military to abide by the procedures and
results of the indigenous legal system may be seen as a
demonstration of respect for the indigenous society itself.
Furthermore, where legal actions brought by the foreign military are
successful, those actions may be said to have been vetted and
deemed consistent with the values of the community. Thus, use of
the indigenous court system may bolster the credibility of the
foreign military, and continued work by the "credible" military with
indigenous legal institutions may then help sustain or improve
upon the legitimacy of those institutions.
The second benefit to the military commander in the use of host
nation criminal law is that it expands the strategic and tactical tools
available to the field commander. Throughout the history of
warfare, military commanders have sought to use all of the methods
available to them to shape the choices of their opponents as
individuals, whether those individuals be the commanders of the
army or individual soldiers. Traditionally, the methods available
for shaping individuals' preferences have been the threat of violent
action, economic ruin through the destruction of property, or the
restriction of personal liberty. In modern warfare - that is to say
Criminal Justice, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 123 (2008). Although Professor Fagan's focus
is on the U.S. criminal justice system, his central argument - that the perceived
failure of legal institutions to be procedurally fair, distributively just, and effective
may result in a lack of public compliance with the law - is certainly informative in
the counterinsurgency context.
59. Of course, the opposite is equally possible, i.e., that a negative feedback
loop is created, where the illegitimacy of one institution is transferred to the other.
This possibility is addressed below.
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warfare that has been conducted by state militaries adhering to the
restrictions of the Laws of War - the loss of personal liberty is
intended to be temporary. 60 Assuming a combatant merits the
protections of the Geneva Conventions, the restriction of liberty of a
Prisoner of War ends with the cessation of hostilities.61 Thus, life
sentences, or even detention longer than the period of military
operations are prohibited. Such limits restrict the leverage a
military commander may apply in attempting to dissuade an
adversary from certain acts. Where permissible, the use of criminal
procedure removes some of these constraints, and depending on the
legal system in question, may provide additional leverage such as
plea bargaining.62
A second method by which the use of indigenous law increases
the options available to military commanders is the "force
multiplier" effect, or the appropriation of the services of indigenous
law enforcement agencies. If military objectives are congruent with
law enforcement goals of local police, opportunities for cooperation
and collaboration may exist. This provides numerous benefits.
First, cooperation between occupation forces and local nationals
increases available manpower. Second, cooperation with local law
enforcement may increase the amount of intelligence available to a
military commander, since indigenous police may possess cultural
knowledge and connections that may permit them access to places
and networks that were impenetrable by foreigners.
Finally, the foreign militaries may be required to enforce local
laws under the laws of war. As noted above, depending on what
stage a counterinsurgency effort is in, different international
agreements may apply. If the counterinsurgency is in the "stop the
bleeding" stage, where the U.S. military is engaged in direct action
missions designed to allow the host nation government to assume
effective control, international laws of occupation are likely
applicable. As Article 43 of the Fourth Hague Convention states,
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into
60. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 37, art. 118.
61. Id.
62. Generally speaking, plea bargaining does not appear to be possible in the
Iraqi system. Although Art. 129 of the Law of Criminal Proceedings permits Iraqi
Investigative Judges (with the permission of the trial level Criminal Court) to offer
immunity in exchange for testimony, offers of reduced punishment in exchange for
testimony do not appear possible, except in specific cases. See Law of Criminal
Proceedings, supra note 12, § 2, 129.
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the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in
his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order
and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the
laws in force in the country.
63
The admonition that occupation forces respect indigenous laws was
further expanded under the Fourth Geneva Convention, with
Article 64 dictating that "[t]he penal laws of the occupied territory
shall remain in force." 64 The Fourth Geneva Convention not only
requires that occupying parties respect the substance of the law of
the occupied territory, but indigenous legal procedure and
institutions as well, as "the tribunals of the occupied territory shall
continue to function in respect of all offences covered by the said
laws."
65
To this end, the international law of occupation dovetails with
the objectives of counterinsurgency - the military commander by
international legal obligation and by strategic necessity must make
use (or at the very least allow the continued operation) of
indigenous legal systems during the "stop the bleeding" stage of the
campaign. Ideally, the continued operation of the host nation legal
system, while under the international receivership of the occupying
power, will encourage the development of institutional competence,
to the end that the domestic regime will be fully capable of
assuming responsibility for law enforcement upon the transfer of
sovereignty.
IV. Challenges to the Use of Law
Reference to international law highlights a threshold problem
with the use of indigenous law to advance military objectives,
namely that criminal prosecution is generally forbidden in cases
where the Geneva Convention applies.66 Further, as noted above, a
successful counterinsurgency may be saddled by the curious
problem that the applicable international laws of armed conflict at
the beginning of the conflict may not be the same as those in latter
stages. For example, the earliest stages of the war in Iraq were
characterized by the military of the United States fighting the
63. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra note
26, art. 43.
64. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 27, art. 64.
65. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 27, art. 64.
66. See note 49, supra.
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military of Iraq, a situation squarely within the jurisdiction of the
Third Geneva Convention as an armed conflict between two parties.
Much later in the war, the conflict consisted primarily of political
and religious groups attacking both American forces and the
security forces of the fledgling Iraqi government - arguably the
kind of conflict envisioned by the drafters of Protocol II. Between
these two points, however, was an uncertain period where the
United States' control of the country was tentative at best, where
elements of the collapsing Iraqi Republican armed forces continued
to resist through the use of unconventional warfare tactics. In that
environment, the United States' legal status as an occupying power
was uncertain (particularly after the issuance of U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1546), as was the legal identity of the remaining
elements of the Iraqi regime not integrated into the new Interim
Iraqi Government. 67
For the counterinsurgency commander, such a transition period
between interstate and intrastate conflict presents a conundrum.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Third Geneva Convention applies at
the beginning of a particular counterinsurgency, those acts of
violence by insurgents directed at the counterinsurgency force may
be considered the legitimate actions of combatants, and therefore
not prosecutable. 68 As the U.S. military gains effective control of the
country, however, its role as an occupying power requires it to
enforce local laws.69 At that stage, actions directed towards the
civilian population would be considered criminal, while certain
actions directed towards the military may not. Once effective
control has been turned over to the nascent host nation government,
acts directed at the counterinsurgency force would be considered
criminal acts, prosecutable in indigenous courts.
The problem is that the boundaries between these legal periods
of time are not well defined, and certain types of crimes (such as
67. Although Security Council Resolution 1546 does not explicitly call on
insurgents to lay down their arms, in the aggregate it may be said to reject the
legitimacy of insurgent violence by, inter alia, endorsing the interim Government of
Iraq ( 4a), calling on Iraqis to implement elections peacefully ( 6), and
condemning acts of terrorism while calling on member states to prevent the transit
of terrorists in and out of Iraq ( 17). S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 35. An official
demand that individuals using violence to subvert the Iraqi Government lay down
their arms only came in 2006, following the national elections of January 30, 2005.
See S.C. Res. 1723 at 2, S/RES/1723 (Nov. 28, 2006).
68. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 37, art. 3.
69. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 27, art. 64.
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conspiracy) may span across multiple periods. Therefore, military
commanders must conduct their counterinsurgency operations in a
given period with an eye towards the future, taking the time to
collect evidence in the hope that, at some future point, the
indigenous government will be capable of prosecuting the crimes of
the past. As noted below, a tension may exist between the
immediate tactical and operational concerns of the military
commander, and the long-term goals of the counterinsurgency.
However, even if a counterinsurgency force makes efforts at
evidence collection in order to improve the chance of prosecution,
they do so against the risk that the applicable laws of war may
bestow a kind of amnesty from future prosecution for the crimes
begun early in the conflict that have continued into the later stages
of the counterinsurgency effort. 70
Beyond the restraints on the use of criminal law imposed by the
Geneva Conventions, a more basic problem exists. Warfare is
fundamentally proactive - combatants strive to find and destroy
their opponents before their opponents find and destroy them. In
contrast, law enforcement is largely reactive (i.e., police seek to find
and prosecute suspects after a crime has been committed). Thus,
commanders who pursue an individual before the commission of a
crime may increase their security in the immediate term at the
expense of having no ability to convict the individual, thereby
weakening security in the long term.
Further, the laws of armed conflict and criminal justice differ in
the standards of proof that each requires.71 In warfare, the standard
of proof required before a combatant may lawfully engage an
opponent is relatively low - generally speaking, the opponent must
meet the Hague Convention definitions of a combatant,72 and the
70. Furthermore, amnesty laws passed by the indigenous government may
"wipe the slate clean" for crimes committed early in the counterinsurgency
campaign. The full text of an amnesty law passed in Iraq in 2008 may be found at
http:/ /www.iraqslogger.com/index.php/post/5506/FullText-IraqsNewAmne
sty-Law. The Amnesty Law (2008) (Iraq).
71. See Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of
Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1082 (2008).
72. See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra
note 26, Annex, art. 1 ("The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies,
but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions: To be
commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; To have a fixed
distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; To carry arms openly; and To
conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.").
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engaging soldier must abide by the Rules of Engagement (e.g.,
positive identification of the opponent and demonstration of hostile
intent) that apply to him.73 Thus, if a soldier of one party encounters
an individual carrying a weapon and dressed like a member of the
opposing party, the soldier may lawfully use the degree of force
permitted under the Rules of Engagement to neutralize the threat.
74
Additionally, in warfare, the emphasis is on the collective (i.e.,
individuals are held personally responsible for actions of the
group).75 Therefore, an individual may be detained or killed
because of her current and open participation as a member of the
armed forces of a party to a conflict. Once the individual lays down
her arms or the conflict ends, the opposing side may not lawfully
bring charges76 or kill the individual. 77
By contrast, the standard of proof in law enforcement is
comparatively high. The prosecuting authority must show evidence
of specific acts that have been committed by the individual accused.
It is likely not sufficient that a person is dressed like a criminal and
carrying a weapon (assuming, inter alia, that no specific weapons
laws apply). Instead, the prosecutor must prove that the defendant
at some prior point used the weapon in a manner that violated a
specific crime. Thus, the emphasis in a criminal justice system is on
individual culpability, rather than association with a group.
78
73. See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 98-104 (sample Rules of
Engagement applicable to the U.S. military during various conflicts).
74. See, for example, the sample Rules of Engagement for Operation Desert
Storm, which dictate, inter alia, that soldiers "1. FIGHT ONLY COMBATANTS; 2.
ATTACK ONLY MILITARY TARGETS; 3. SPARE CIVILIAN PERSONS AND
OBJECTS; 4. RESTRICT DESTRUCTION TO WHAT YOUR MISSION REQUIRES."
Id. at 101.
75. See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 24, at 128 ("War is a
relationship between one State and another, or, one may also say, between one
belligerent Power and another; it is not a relationship between individual
persons.").
76. Detaining powers may prosecute prisoners of war, but only for crimes they
commit as individuals, not for their participation in the conflict as lawful
combatants. See Geneva Convention Ill, supra note 37, art. 87. A similar provision
exists for protected persons: "[no protected person may be punished for an offence
he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties . . . are prohibited."
See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 27, art. 33.
77. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 37, art. 13.
78. See, e.g., Iraqi Constitution, Art. 19, §8, available at http://portal.unesco.org
/ci/en/files/20704/11332732681iraqi constitution.en.pdf/iraqi-constitutionen.p
df. Of course, an individual can be prosecuted for conspiracy, but such usually
requires that the individual possess the intent to enter into an agreement to commit
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Faced with these fundamental differences between warfare and
law enforcement, the military commander may attempt to "square
the circle" through increased reliance on intelligence to facilitate
aggressive prosecution of inchoate crimes such as conspiracy,
thereby initiating the criminal justice process before the suspect in
question has an opportunity to attack military forces. Pursuing such
a strategy, the military commander will likely confront the
numerous challenges attendant to prosecuting inchoate crimes, such
as proving mens rea when the overt acts of the accused could be
variously interpreted as incriminating or innocuous, or facing
judicial disapproval of invasive surveillance and monitoring of
private citizens. Routine focus on such crimes is likely to lead to
frustration of the counterinsurgency forces, and possible alienation
of indigenous legal actors.
Reliance by foreign military commanders on local legal systems
presents an additional tradeoff, namely the relative certainty of
military operations versus the relative uncertainty of indigenous
institutions. Although there is nothing certain about warfare, the
modern American military commander may generally rely on the
soldiers under his command to comply with his orders and work
towards the fulfillment of the commander's intent.79 Such cannot be
said of the police, prosecutors, and judges of a sovereign legal
system, all of whom are likely to have their own conceptions of
what is in the best interest of their community. Indeed, many
individuals in the judicial system may harbor resentment towards
the presence of a foreign military in their country, and be
sympathetic towards those who commit crimes aimed at harming
the foreign power.80
Additionally, when dealing with failed states or developing
nations, issues of political corruption, religious or tribal influence,
poor financial infrastructure, and the lack of qualified personnel
may impede or completely disrupt the operation of the criminal
an offense with others. See, e.g., Penal Code of 1969, 33, 55 (1969) (Iraq), available
at http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/Iraqi-Penal Codej1969.pdf.
79. Indeed, failure to obey an order is itself a crime. See Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 894 (1956).
80. The Geneva Conventions recognize that people will desire to resist an
occupying power. Article 68 of the Fourth Geneva Convention stipulates that
actions taken against an occupying power, which do not harm individuals nor
seriously damage property should be punished through simple imprisonment. See
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 27, art. 68.
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justice system. Military commanders may find their attempts to
affect the security of a country frustrated by a legal system not yet
mature enough to handle complex and politically sensitive cases,
and thus may decide to pursue options other than criminal
prosecution.
While abstention from using indigenous legal venues may thus
be tempting, the truth is that there is no way to improve a country's
legal system but to permit it to work through its problems with real
cases in controversy. The law cannot be developed if it is not
permitted to fail: The actors within the system should be held
responsible for the consequences of their actions. Of course, in a
developing state where all government institutions are weak, and
the prejudices of the people may be easily reignited, the
consequences of the failure of the criminal justice system may be
great, leading to significant security concerns for both the
indigenous population and the foreign military. Such are two of the
classic dilemmas of counterinsurgency: (1) "[s]ometimes, the more
you protect your force, the less secure you may be," and (2), "[tjhe
host nation doing something tolerably is normally better than us
doing it well." 81
Finally, the use of host nation legal institutions to advance
counterinsurgency objectives raises questions of institutional
competence for the military (i.e., whether it is appropriate for the
average soldier to receive and in turn provide law enforcement
training).82 The current U.S. statutory regime - built primarily
around the Foreign Assistance Act - generally prohibits foreign
assistance funding for training law enforcement agencies, 83 and
either presidential or congressional authorization is usually required
to enable the military to provide training to foreign police
departments. 84 With these constraints on the training of foreign
police departments, reluctance by the U.S. military to invest time
and money in preparing soldiers to perform law enforcement
81. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, supra note 20, at 1-154.
82. See id. at 6-16.
83. 22 U.S.C. §2420 (1999).
84. See DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, supra note 20, at D-1, D-2. In Somalia,
military forces were only permitted to train local police forces once a presidential
directive was signed. However, in 1996, the Foreign Assistance Act was changed
by Congress to allow military assistance in post-conflict police training. See Marc L.
Warren, Operational Law - A Concept Matures, 152 MIL. L. REV. 33, 45 n.46 (1996).
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"foreign internal defense" would be understandable.85
As noted above, however, in order for a counterinsurgency to
be successful, U.S. military forces must be capable of targeting
wanted individuals throughout all stages of the insurgency.
Therefore, even if as the counterinsurgency manual states, "[police
are best trained by other police," 86 it is essential military personnel
possess the knowledge and skills necessary to cooperate and
interact with their host nation law enforcement partners, especially
as a counterinsurgency moves from focus on combat operations to
law enforcement. In order to be effective as both participants and
advocates of a host nation legal system, members of a
counterinsurgency force would need to be trained in local criminal
procedure, as well as other foundational police skills as witness
questioning and basic crime scene investigation. While these skills
are present in certain units within the military,8 7 they are not
broadly taught to military personnel. Success in future
counterinsurgency operations requires that the military train
specialists in indigenous legal systems, and that basic legal
instruction be provided to ground troops likely to interact with host
nation forces.
A. Evidentiary Problems
Procedurally, the convergence of military operations with
criminal prosecution presents many problems, not least of which is
the fact that military intelligence does not easily translate into
criminal evidence. Warfare has always been a process of developing
techniques and tools designed to provide one side with a distinct
advantage over the other. In modem warfare, possessing an
information edge over one's opponent is a significant advantage,
and great lengths are taken to maintain secrecy so that one side may
monopolize the strategic and tactical benefits such information
provides. The fact that combatants would be required to reveal
their methods and means to a neutral arbiter in order to fully realize
the fruits of their efforts runs counter to the entire history of
85. See generally JOINT PUBLICATION 3-05.1 supra note 53 at 1-2.
86. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, supra note 20, at 6-16.
87. For example, commands such as the Army's Criminal Investigation
Command, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the Air Force Office of
Special Investigations include active duty units trained in civilian law enforcement
techniques and technical procedures.
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warfare. Yet, this is precisely what is required to obtain a
conviction; in order to assess the merits of a case, judges must probe
not only the substance of the information they are presented with,
but also the means by which it was obtained.
Thus, introducing intelligence in a host nation criminal
proceeding is likely to give military commanders a moment of
pause. Not only will a criminal proceeding cause methods and
means to be revealed, but it would potentially provide third parties
with a degree of control over the intelligence methods available to
the commander. Consider a case where the military wishes to use
some form of technical surveillance such as wiretapping similar to
that used by domestic law enforcement in the United States. Under
the Iraqi constitution, any form of electronic surveillance intended
for prosecution requires judicial approval.88 Therefore, if military
commanders wish to tap a suspected insurgent's phone for potential
use in future criminal proceedings, they must risk compromising
the secrecy of their intelligence efforts by obtaining judicial
permission. As a result, military commanders may decide to forgo
pursuing the surveillance, or more likely, abstain from using the
intelligence gained through surveillance in criminal proceedings,
thereby weakening the case.
Even if military commanders feel that the benefit of releasing
intelligence to judicial authorities is worth the operational and
informational risks, a threshold administrative problem must be
addressed. The system of classification used by the United States
military and intelligence agencies is highly decentralized, in that the
individual or organization that originates an intelligence report sets
(within established guidelines) its classification level, and any other
user of the intelligence must submit a request to the originator to
lower the classification level or to declassify the report. 89 Assuming
that no policy forbids the release of the information (e.g., that it does
not reveal methods and means), the individual seeking the release
must therefore not only work through bureaucratic channels to seek
permission for release, but must also task the originator to perform
the work of "sanitizing" the report for release. 90
88. Iraqi Constitution, art. 38.
89. See Exec. Order No. 12,958, 76 Fed. Reg. 19,825 § 4.2 (Apr. 17, 1995). See also
Department of the Navy Information Security Program Regulation, SECNAVINST
5510.36. (2006).
90. See Exec. Order 12,958, § 3.1.
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Considering this, the potential exists for agencies or
organizations to differ on the priority of the release request, or to
differ on the form and content of the sanitized report, either of
which can frustrate the intent of the requesting organization to
provide intelligence to a foreign government for prosecution
purposes. The problem is compounded when one considers the
number of military units and government intelligence agencies that
may be gathering intelligence on groups and individuals within a
given country.91  Of course, the rule of declassification by the
originator is supported by sound policy rationale, in that it would
be unwise to permit individuals and organizations without subject
matter expertise to determine whether or not to reveal that
information to outside parties. Considering this, the establishment
of uniform guidelines for the declassification of information to
foreign governments for criminal prosecution may help to reduce -
but not eliminate - the bureaucratic delay in sanitization of
information across the intelligence community. The formation of
such policies takes time, however, and would need to be tailored to
the unique security environment of the country in question.
Therefore, the coordination of intelligence release is likely to present
itself anew as a problem for each country in which the United States
wishes to utilize the criminal justice system for the accomplishment
of military objectives.
Beyond these conceptual and administrative barriers, there
exist numerous differences between intelligence operations and
judicial proceedings on the question of the testing of the veracity,
reliability, and relevance of information. These differences exist in
part because the goals of the two procedures are not identical.
Judicial proceedings seek to gather and weigh information in order
to assign legal rights and duties. Intelligence operations seek and
analyze information to, inter alia, assist commanders and policy-
makers in their decision making.92 In judicial proceedings, the cast
91. Consider, for example, that each of the sixteen intelligence agencies under
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence may gather intelligence on Iraq, as
do the intelligence departments of Central Command, Special Operations
Command, and Transportation Command, as well as the intelligence departments
of the multinational commands under Multinational Corps Iraq (Multinational
Divisions Baghdad, Central, Southeast, Northeast, North, Multinational Force West,
and Logistical Support Area Anaconda), and each of the major units under the
Multinational Divisions (for example, II Marine Expeditionary Force under
Multinational Force West).
92. Fred Manget, Intelligence and the Criminal Law System, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y
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of "characters," as well as the potential outcomes, are rather
narrowly defined (i.e., there is one or more identified defendants,
who face the possibility of a finding of guilt or innocence for
committing a certain act, or acquittal due to procedural
complications). Considering the limited purview of judicial action,
it is understandable that courts would wish to narrow the range,
subject, and type of information it considers, as well as the manner
in which the court receives the information. In contrast, the
strategic and tactical options available to a military commander are
far less constrained. Targets may be captured or killed, engaged or
ignored, co-opted or deterred. Furthermore, resources alone
constrain the universe of "characters" on which a military
commander may gather intelligence. Thus, considering these
differences between intelligence operations and judicial
proceedings, it is understandable why the use of information
derived through one epistemological process to make judgments in
another will likely be procedurally and idiomatically problematic.
Specifically, at least four procedural problems exist in the use of
intelligence as evidence. First, the conversion of raw information
into intelligence is strongly dependent on inference, or put
differently, circumstantial evidence - the "existence of a fact, from
which the existence or nonexistence of some fact in question may be
inferred as a probable consequence." 93 For example, from specific
seismic activity, an intelligence agency may deduce without visual
or other sensory observation that a country hundreds of miles away
has tested a nuclear weapon.94 In many legal systems, however,
circumstantial evidence is problematic95 if not expressly forbidden.96
Second, intelligence officers do not necessarily place as much
weight on chain of custody as criminal courts. Thus, procedures
established for obtaining intelligence may place more emphasis on
the speed of obtaining and the content of information, rather than
the careful and open documentation of who possessed the
REV. 415, 415-16 (2006).
93. William P. Richardson, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 111, at 68 (3d ed. 1928).
94. See, e.g., Bill Gertiz, U.S. Doubts Korean Test Was Nuclear, WASH. TIMES, Oct.
10, 2006.
95. In the United States, the pragmatic test of "whether the evidence makes any
fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence in
question" generally determines admissibility. 1A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 39 (Tillers rev. 1983).
96. See, e.g., Law of Criminal Proceedings, supra note 12, " 169.
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information at each stage, from the originator to the final recipient.
Indeed, revealing information such as methods of collection,
identity of sources, and military personnel in open court may
present security risks in itself.97
Third, hearsay (or derivative information) is a vital and
welcome part of human intelligence, whereas it is rejected - or at
least carefully scrutinized - in many legal systems.98  While
intelligence gathering and military operations are continuing
processes, most criminal trials are one-off affairs, which is to say
that the victims, defendants and witnesses are unlikely to appear
before the court on multiple occasions for other matters.99 Thus, the
criminal procedure ban on hearsay makes sense, since judges are
deprived of many of the tools available to military intelligence
professionals for evaluating the accuracy of the information. For
example, in the courtroom, inadmissible hearsay evidence cannot be
"rescued" by considering the integrity or character of the individual
giving testimony. In the intelligence context, however, previous
positive cooperation with an informant may give increased
credibility to the information provided. Furthermore, the
inadmissibility of hearsay testimony is not affected by the number
of individuals who come forward with the same information. In
contrast, an intelligence officer would be foolish to reject intelligence
that is confirmed by multiple sources simply because none of the
informants had direct access to the information.
The fourth rationale for the exclusion of derivative evidence in
common law systems is the manner in which evidence is introduced
at trial. At common law, two parties seek out and present evidence
97. Manget, supra note 92, at 416.
98. In common law systems, hearsay is either excluded or admitted under a
number of limited circumstances. In civil law countries, the risk of improper
influence of derivative information is mitigated either through the "principle of
immediacy" (i.e., that there be a direct contact between the decision makers and
their source of information), or the threat of reversal on subsequent review due to
insufficient justification for a particular finding. See Mirjan Damaska, Of Hearsay
and its Analogues, 76 MINN. L. REv. 425 (1992).
99. In another context, the contrast between episodic civil law proceedings and
"one shot" common law proceedings is cited by Professor Mirjan Damaska as being
one of the historical causes of the two systems' differing approaches to hearsary
evidence. In civil law countries, fact finders presented with hearsay could suspend
proceedings in order to locate and question the original declarant. In the English
system, however, the logistical difficulties in reassembling a jury made such delays
in court proceedings impractical, thus leading to a bias against derivative evidence.
Id. at 428-30.
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supportive of their respective arguments. Under this system, it is
easy to imagine biased witnesses who give false testimony in order
to advance the cause of one of the parties. Through the process of
confrontation, the opposing party may seek to reveal a witness'
contradictions, inconsistencies, and physical reactions that reveal
the testimony to be false. As Professor Damaska points out, though,
the task of testing the truthfulness of a statement is far more difficult
where the witness can falsely ascribe a statement to a declarant who
is unavailable for cross-examination. 100
With respect to the manner in which information is collected for
consideration by the decision maker, the process of intelligence
gathering is closer to the civil law system of judicial inquisition than
the common law adversarial process. That is to say that the
intelligence professional seeks out all the information that he or she
deems relevant to resolving the question at hand, rather than being
constrained to the "bipolar" record presented by two biased parties.
Therefore, some of the common law rationales for the exclusion of
derivative information are not present in intelligence gathering.
However, this is not to say that the question of bias is moot in
intelligence collection - to the contrary, intelligence professionals
must constantly evaluate their own preconceptions as well as the
reliability of information given to them by persons whose
motivations and allegiances may be suspect. This is accomplished
through the consideration of consistent alternate reporting, or
through the disregard of unverified hearsay information.
Even if the intelligence professional is satisfied that the
derivative information in question is trustworthy, this does not
eliminate the bias problem when a counterinsurgency force wishes
to introduce hearsay evidence to an indigenous court. Advocacy of
the use of specific evidence introduces the specter of adversarial
partiality, even in a civil law court room, for the judge must not only
consider the motivation of the witness, but also the
counterinsurgent force that goes against the inquisitorial method by
recommending evidence to the court. The trial judge may call the
original declarant to testify in order to probe the trustworthiness of
the statement. However, while the motivations of the
counterinsurgency force in recommending the evidence might be
self-evident, it would likely be distractive, impractical, and
politically ill-advised for the judge to examine the
100. Id. at 431.
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counterinsurgency force's role in recommending the testimony.
Finally, there is the question of the sufficiency of evidence.
While it may be that only prudence dictates that military
commanders seek multiple sources of information before choosing
to act on a piece of intelligence, some legal systems explicitly dictate
that certain forms of evidence - no matter how reliable - are
insufficient for prosecution.10 1 For example, imagine that a military
commander receives information from a spy giving the current
location of an individual the spy claims is responsible for numerous
insurgent acts. The spy has a history of reliable reporting and the
information on the individual's whereabouts is extremely time-
sensitive, since it is likely that the wanted individual will flee before
the commander can get a second source to confirm the spy's report.
In such a case, the commander may be justified in acting based
solely on the information given to him by the spy. However, even if
the information resulted in the successful detainment of the
individual, the testimony of the spy alone would be insufficient for
prosecution in Iraqi courts, since under the Iraqi Law of Criminal
Proceedings "[o]ne testimony is not sufficient for a ruling if it is not
corroborated by other convincing evidence or a confession of the
accused." 102
B. Use of Technology and Forensics
Modern intelligence collection is very much dependent on
technology and forensics, as the seismic evidence of nuclear activity
example above demonstrates. However, the introduction of
scientific and technical information into a criminal trial is fraught
with difficulties to say the least, as esoteric information must be
explained in order to demonstrate its relevance. This inherently
requires that the technical process that produced the information be
laid bare for consideration by the trier of fact - a prospect that is
unappealing for those who wish to maintain the secrecy of a
particular technique.
Besides the reluctance of military commanders to reveal the
specific means by which they come to possess information, there
exists the issue of whether judges would accept and give weight to
any such information submitted to the court. Here, at least three
101. See, e.g., Law on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 12, 213(B).
102. Id.
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problems may exist. First, members of the local judiciary may not
be familiar with the type of technical evidence presented to them. In
every judicial system, courts adapt to ever-more complex forensic
and technical evidence through self education, and reliance on
experts.103 However, cultural or nationalistic biases may come into
play when such edifying information comes to a judge via foreign
sources, causing the local judge to reject or view the evidence with
skepticism.
Second, even if judges and other officials in the criminal justice
system are familiar with the type of forensic evidence presented,
they may nonetheless be reluctant to make controversial rulings
based on evidence that is highly technical in nature, lest an
uninformed public view the ruling as illegitimate. 0 4 This may be
especially problematic in developing nations, where the average
level of education may be comparatively low. 105 Therein lies a more
103. In the United States, Fed. R. Evid. 702 permits the testimony of experts in
order to explain scientific evidence to the trier of fact. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Supreme Court set forth a five-part test for
U.S. judges to evaluate the credibility of scientific testimony: (1) whether the
reasoning or methodology can be tested, (2) whether the theory or technique has
been subjected to peer review and publication, (3) the known or potential rate of
error, (4) whether there is "general acceptance" of the theory or technique, and (5)
the existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation. Id. at 595-96.
Here it is interesting to note that the Daubert test would be rather unhelpful in
evaluating the soundness of secretive intelligence collection methods, due to the
unlikelihood that such techniques would be available for peer review and "general
acceptance."
104. The proposition that judges, due to their education and training, are more
capable of understanding complex technical or scientific evidence than society writ
large is debatable at best. An interesting study comparing the respective
comprehension of scientific data by judges and juries found that each group
understood certain information better than the other. However, the author
proposes that such differences may be the result of the manner in which the
evidence was presented, as well as the process of deliberation by juries that judges
do not undertake. Valerie P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific Evidence, 16 J.L. &
POL'Y 19, 42-46 (2007). Nonetheless, greater differences in education levels in
developing countries may make the comprehension differences between judges and
the public more pronounced.
105. For example, school life expectancy in Iraq is 10 years, compared to fifteen
in the United States. CIA World Factbook: Iraq, available at https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/ the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2009).
It is possible, however, that sources of technical knowledge other than formal
education may inform the general populace's understanding of scientific evidence,
representations of forensic evidence in popular media in particular. However, as
Tom Tyler argues, there is little scientific evidence that the "'CSI' effect" actually
exists, and if it does, it may equally result in greater likelihood of conviction rather
than acquittal. Tom Tyler, Viewing CSI And The Threshold Of Guilt, 115 YALE L.J.
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philosophical question of whether a conviction can be considered
fair if the public does not understand the basis.
Third, the process of providing intelligence for admission as
evidence in many cases would require possession by local police
and courts of the technological facilities to access the information.
However, in many developing countries, local law enforcement
agencies lack basic technology such as computers and internet
access. Indeed, the U.S. Government Accountability Office cites
examples of Iraqi law enforcement agencies having insufficient fuel
to travel to crime scenes, and military units being forced to barter
with American forces for computer support services.106 Thus, even
if judges wished to accept technical evidence, the local police may
not have the technical ability to present it to them, and the courts
may not have the capacity to receive it.
C. Human Intelligence
Concerns over the use of intelligence as evidence is not
confined to the world of technical information. The oldest form of
intelligence, human espionage, is likewise ill-suited for use in the
courtroom. The relationship between a foreign power and its
confidential local informants is predicated on the promise that the
foreign power will protect the identity of the individual. Asking an
informant to testify in a domestic court violates this promise, and
potentially places the informant in physical or legal jeopardy. While
many judicial systems have procedures for confidential testimony, 107
the security of those procedures is only as reliable as the individuals
charged with performing them. If a legal system is plagued by
corruption or sectarian allegiances, confidential informants may be
understandably reluctant to testify, lest their identity be leaked.
Further, the testimony of an individual who is secretly
cooperating with a foreign power may be greeted with skepticism
by local courts. It takes little imagination to attribute selfish motives
1050 (2006). Anecdotally, many Iraqis told the author that they routinely watched
"CSI," and one police colonel half-jokingly stated that he told his officers to watch
the show as a training tool.
106. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: DOD
ASSESSMENT OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES' UNITS AS INDEPENDENT NOT CLEAR BECAUSE
ISF SUPPORT CAPABILITIES ARE NOT FULLY DEVELOPED 13 (2007).
107. See Law of Criminal Proceedings, supra note 12, 47 (witnesses to a felony
may make a report in person to an IJ, a Public Prosecutor, or at any Police Station);
Law No. 119 of 1988 amended Article 47 to allow secret testimony.
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(e.g., financial gain) to individuals assisting foreign powers in a
manner that may be viewed as betrayal of one's culture, religion, or
nationality. At worst, such cooperation may constitute treason
against the local state.
Of course, the decision whether or not to testify against a
wanted insurgent is entirely personal to the informant. It may be
very likely that the same motivations that drive an individual to
become an informant to U.S. forces (e.g., a desire to end violence in
the host country) may lead the same individual to come forward to
local authorities with criminal evidence, despite the dangers
attendant in doing so. Against this backdrop, it would be wise for
those members of the military and representatives of the United
States government who meet with confidential informants to be
forthright about both the need for and potential risks in providing
criminal evidence. Where a particular informant is too valuable to
the counterinsurgency force to merit the risk of exposing that
individual to legal liability or physical harm, the military
commander may need to pursue other methods of gaining
information (such as sub-informants), or exercise "prosecutorial
discretion" by forgoing prosecution of the case.
Another tradeoff between intelligence and evidence is the
question of whether information gained by military personnel
should be used to secure a conviction or used to find the next target.
Often, these two goals are not in contention. However, rapid action
on information gained from one individual may often be the best
way to find associates of that individual within the same group.
The proper investigation, documentation, and recordation of
information for specific crimes for evidentiary purposes may create
delays that give associates of the arrested suspect time to discover
the detention, destroy other incriminating evidence, or flee the area.
The temptation to move quickly on targets is likely to be particularly
felt during the initial "stop the bleeding" stage of a
counterinsurgency. However, insurgencies tend to be protracted
affairs, where key actors may evade capture for years. Thus, even
when military efforts are focused more on combat than law
enforcement, efforts should be made to record information essential
for conviction, so that the option of prosecution remains viable later.
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D. Cultural Influence
As noted above, participation by the counterinsurgency force in
the host nation legal system may, under certain circumstances,
confer legitimacy on the indigenous legal institutions. Likewise,
where host nation institutions possess legitimacy in the eyes of the
local populace, they may provide credibility to the
counterinsurgency force. Either way, participation by U.S. military
forces in indigenous legal proceedings is likely to affect more than
perceptions of the host nation legal system. A legal system is
shaped by the individuals using it. A counterinsurgency military
force that becomes an actor in the host nation legal system cannot
help but affect the substance and procedure of that system. In doing
so, a counterinsurgency power may inadvertently or consciously
impose some of its values onto the indigenous system.
The counterinsurgency force may passively affect the system
through the cases it chooses to pursue and forgo. By bringing cases
for specific crimes, the military creates a hierarchy of priorities. If
the counterinsurgency military is an actor of significance in the
indigenous legal system, that hierarchy may be adopted by the local
institutions. Further, the military may actively shape the legal
system by encouraging or forcing local legal institutions to adopt
certain procedures and practices. In either case, if the result of the
military's interaction with the local legal institutions is that the
priorities and values of the institutions do not match those of the
indigenous population, the legitimacy of those institutions may
suffer. In essence, the reverse of the positive legitimacy "feedback
loop" may occur, undermining the legitimacy of both the host
nation and the counterinsurgency force.
In order to avoid such a result, counterinsurgency commanders
must choose their cases and targets with care. While there may be
great temptation to pursue prosecution of those individuals who
threaten the military force, such actions may create a rift between
the counterinsurgency force and the host nation. The local populace
is likely to view attacks against a foreign military as less important
than crimes committed against their neighbors, friends, and family.
Thus, military commanders with limited resources may do well to
focus the balance of their efforts on prosecution of crimes of
perceived importance to the local community, while giving
prosecution of military targets secondary emphasis. Ultimately, it is
the perception of safety by the local populace that determines the
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success of a counterinsurgency effort, and not the safety of the
counterinsurgency force.108
Just like an actor cannot help but shape the system he works in,
so too does the system shape the actor. As the counterinsurgency
manual suggests, use of an indigenous legal system is likely to be
part of a larger effort at building the institutions of a state.109 In such
an environment, progress is unlikely to be uniform across all areas
that the military wishes to affect. Military leaders are thus likely to
encounter scenarios where goals in one area of the
counterinsurgency are in conflict with goals in another, and strict
adherence to the rule of law by the military may inhibit or impede
economic, political, or security gains. This is especially likely in
traditional societies, where legal disputes are often dealt with
outside the formal judicial system, so as not to damage fragile
community relationships. For example, insistence by military
commanders that a member of a particular tribe be tried for certain
alleged crimes may alienate the leaders of that tribe from the
military, thereby sacrificing assistance the tribe could bring in
helping to strengthen the economy and security of their area of
influence. Thus, the military leader may be forced in the name of
"the greater good" to allow the crime to be dealt with through tribal
law, rather than the court system.
Of course, diplomacy has always been a process of negotiations
and concessions, and "armed diplomacy" is no exception.
However, when the concession to be made is adherence to the rule
of law, a slippery slope is created: the law is the law, except where it
is not. One group's tribal law is another group's vigilante justice.
Thus, where concessions are to be made, two questions must be
addressed. First, does the proposed concession violate U.S. or
controlling international law? If the answer is yes, then the
concession - no matter how well-intentioned - cannot be
countenanced. Second, if the concession is of the spirit, rather than
the letter of the law, what goal does the concession serve? Respect
for local culture is essential for success in counterinsurgencies, but it
may all too easily be used as justification for courses of action
expedient to immediate security objectives. All else being equal,
turning an individual over to tribal or religious courts may be
permissible when done to honor local conceptions of fairness and
108. See DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, supra note 20, at 1-149.
109. See id. at 5-15.
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justice, but it may not be done solely to circumvent courts
unsympathetic to the counterinsurgency force.
V. The Future (Ready or Not)
The Bilateral Security Agreement dictates that United States
Forces will withdraw from Iraq no later than December 31, 2011.110
If the terms of that clause are honored, it will mark the end of one of
the most expensive wars ever undertaken by the United States."1
With the exception of counterinsurgency efforts underway in
Afghanistan, it is unlikely that the United States will attempt nation
building on a similar scale anytime in the foreseeable future.
It is equally unlikely, however, that the military's experiment of
using indigenous legal systems for achieving foreign policy goals
will be left behind in Iraq alongside broken vehicles and abandoned
operating bases. Indeed, there are many reasons to believe that the
use of foreign courts and cooperation with local law enforcement
agencies will come to embody the rule, rather than the exception, of
military operations in the future.
To understand why, two trends of contemporary society must
be considered. First, the world is becoming smaller. The increasing
connectivity of the global community through communication,
travel, and trade has provided numerous positive economic,
political, and cultural benefits. At the same time, however, it has
enabled like-minded non-state actors to coordinate and collaborate
across state lines and large geographic distances to achieve common
goals.11 2 Thus, terrorist organizations may have their political or
ideological leaders in one country, their finance cell in a second
country, and their target of operations in a third. Such
decentralization makes the disruption of international terror
organizations and crime syndicates through traditional military
operations extremely difficult. The diplomatic efforts required to
convince sovereign states to permit military action within their
borders may be highly disproportionate to the size of the targeted
cell, while covert and clandestine operations risk severe political
110. Withdrawal Agreement, supra note 10, art. 24, § 1.
111. See Stephen Daggett, Cost of Major Wars, CONG. RES. SERVICE, July 24, 2008, at
2. By 2008, the Iraq War was estimated to have cost $648 billion (in constant 2008
dollars), third in total cost behind the World War II ($4.1 trillion), and Vietnam
($686 billion). Id.
112. See DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, supra note 20, at 1-22.
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repercussions should they be uncovered.
Second, advances in technology have expanded the capacity for
violence at all levels - what may be termed weapons of mass
destruction compared to the destructive weapons of the masses.
State militaries are capable of drawing on large national budgets
and the international arms industry to field extremely complex and
destructive weapons systems, such as advanced cruise missiles and
anti-air radar systems. At the same time, the globalization has put
incredibly destructive weapons in the hands of individuals, be it
knock-off Kalashnikov rifles made in China, or improvised
explosive devices made in a residential basement from instructions
found on the internet.
The results of these two trends are that individuals have the
capacity to conduct acts of violence with regional or international
consequences using low cost technology, against which the
advanced weapons of nation states may be of limited effect.113
Further, any attempt to use conventional military forces against
small, decentralized opponents may appear heavy handed, meaning
that military victory may come at the cost of losing the battle to win
hearts and minds.
Against this backdrop, the use of indigenous law enforcement
is extremely attractive as a policy option. First, use of indigenous
law requires the military to partner with elements of the local
government, thus potentially reducing diplomatic resistance to
military operations within a sovereign state. As noted above, use of
an indigenous legal system demonstrates respect for that institution,
and may by extension show respect for the broader community and
its values. Moreover, partnership with local law enforcement
agencies creates incentives on the part of the host nation agency to
increase and maintain that partnership - in other words, a local
interest group likely to advocate U.S. interests domestically is
created.
Second, the appropriation of indigenous law enforcement
agencies for military objectives is both cost efficient (since they do
not need the kind of logistical support that deployed military forces
require), and less intrusive to the local community. The "force
multiplier" effect of cooperation with and cooption of local law
enforcement personnel may have the additional effect of reducing
113. See, e.g., MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR (1991).
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the "footprint" of U.S. forces necessary to accomplish a given
military objective. This is not necessarily to say that the utilization
of indigenous forces is intended to disguise the involvement of
American personnel. As noted above, in some cases, the
involvement of the U.S. military in a particular criminal case may be
deleterious in the eyes of the local populace. In other cases,
however, association with American forces may provide a degree of
legitimacy. In these cases, the number of U.S. forces needed to
provide assistance to local law enforcement are likely to be far less
than that required to conduct operations unilaterally.
A. The Way Forward
If use of indigenous legal systems is to remain a viable option
for the achievement of military objectives in the future, several
practical considerations should be addressed. Currently, the
Foreign Assistance Act only permits police training to countries
which have emerged from periods of conflict.114 While that is a
broad category that may be liberally applied, the focus on post-
conflict development may preclude the military from providing
police training to countries in the midst of combating counter-
democratic insurgencies. This creates a gap in military capabilities.
Assuming proper Executive and Congressional authorization, the
military may have the authority to assist local military forces in
fighting insurgent forces during the active combat phase of an
insurgency. Likewise, the Foreign Assistance Act permits the
training of police once the conflict has come to a conclusion.
However, as noted above, the distinction between these two phases
of insurgencies is not always clear. By precluding the training of
police forces during combat operations, the Foreign Assistance Act
may lock the military into a strategy of cooperating with the
indigenous military, rather than the approach of working by, with,
and through the indigenous police forces during the nebulous
period between open insurgent warfare and post-conflict
reconstruction.
Furthermore, while Presidential and Congressional
authorization may permit U.S. military forces to engage in the
114. 22 U.S.C. § 2420. The Foreign Assistance Act does include a provision
allowing the President to expend funds and provide military assistance in
emergency situations. See 22 U.S.C. § 2318 (2000). However, because this measure
is by design reactive, it does not overcome criticisms of the Act discussed infra.
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training of indigenous law enforcement personnel, such
authorization is likely to be ad hoc and specific to the conflict in
question. As a result, the military is unlikely to conduct advance
training of specialized units dedicated to training and working with
local police forces. In addition to the understanding of law
enforcement techniques, the acquisition of cultural knowledge and
linguistic skills necessary for successful engagement with local
officials is likely to take years to develop. Failure by the military to
prepare in advance for contingencies in potential "hot spots" may
result in costly delays in acquiring those skills once hostilities have
begun. Also, failure to adequately prepare a needed skill is likely to
resonate across to other areas of the military. For example, the lack
of military personnel trained to work with indigenous law
enforcement prevents U.S. intelligence personnel and ground force
commanders from adapting to the challenges of working within the
local criminal justice system.
Beyond the planning and training stages, several other
considerations are necessary once hostilities have begun. First, it is
essential that counterinsurgency forces integrate host nation actors
into all steps of the targeting process. Indeed, this is prescribed by
the Counterinsurgency Manual, 115 with the intent of building local
capacity. However, it is not sufficient for counterinsurgency forces
to work with host nation personnel heavily in some areas of the
targeting process, while pursuing only nominal cooperation in
others. In the short term, the result of such an incomplete
incorporation may be frustration of the targeting process, where
host nation forces with little interest in a particular target may exert
little to no effort in advancing the criminal case when the targeted
individual is turned over to the judicial system for prosecution. In
the long term, failure to fully train host nation forces in specific
aspects of the targeting will likely result in critical failure when the
host nation begins to operate unilaterally.
Naturally, concerns over operational security may create a
strong desire to keep certain aspects of targeting operations "off
limits" to non-U.S. personnel, particularly in areas where
incorporation of host nationals would expose the methods and
means of U.S. intelligence gathering, such as local informants
working with the United States. Still, while the method by which
information is gained may be withheld, it is essential that acquired
115. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, supra note 20, at 2-1.
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intelligence is shared with host nation forces throughout the
development of the target. Doing so may enable host nation
personnel to help identify and fill key intelligence gaps, and give the
host nation a stake in the target. Additionally, sharing intelligence
with host nation forces may provide the informational "seed" from
which the host nation may grow indigenous methods and means of
information gathering, such as informant networks of their own that
are essential to law enforcement investigations.
As alluded to above, host nation personnel are as likely to bring
information to the counterinsurgency force as they are to take from
it. Such local knowledge is especially important with regards to
indigenous law. Effective navigation of a host nation's legal system
requires a degree of esoteric knowledge that is difficult for foreign-
trained attorneys to acquire. Regardless of the capabilities and
professionalism of the Judge Advocates advising counterinsurgency
commanders, language barriers and differing legal traditions will
present challenging roadblocks to American-trained attorneys
seeking to operate in a host nation legal system. At best, the delay
required for Judge Advocates to become educated in a host
country's law and procedure will come at the cost of effective
implementation of the military commander's intent. At worst, a
lack of understanding of the nuances of a host nation's law could
completely frustrate specific counterinsurgency efforts. Thus,
having independent host nation counsel - separate from judicial
and law enforcement officials with whom the military engages -
could present a significant boon by assisting the military
commander either through private consultation, or through active
representation.
Finally, incorporating host nation personnel puts a "local face"
on the targeting process, thereby potentially mitigating the effects of
anti-U.S. sentiment on the part of actors in the indigenous legal
system. Such incorporation may also confer "legitimacy by
association" in the eyes of the local populace, creating the kind of
positive feedback loop from which both the military and domestic
institutions benefit. Of course, collaboration with indigenous actors
is perhaps just as likely to create a negative reputation as it is to
bestow credit. For this reason, careful and continuous vetting of
indigenous partners is essential, 116 as public perceptions of
corruption, or political, ethnic, or religious bias may quickly taint
116. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, supra note 20, at 6-33.
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the counterinsurgency force through guilt by association.
Finally, while incorporation of host nation personnel may slow
or impede operations, it must be remembered that in
counterinsurgency operations the process is almost as important as
the result. The sacrifice of unilateral efficiency is often more than
worth the benefit of increasing host nation capacity. This is
especially true in the greater realm of establishing the rule of law,
where initial efforts by the host nation are likely to be slow,
frustrating, and ineffective, and where failure can undermine gains
in other areas. However, while seeking to maintain overall security
improvements, it is preferable to permit host nation failure in
individual criminal cases, than to unilaterally ensure justice in every
instance. In the famous words of T. E. Lawrence, "Do not try to do
too much with your own hands. Better [they] do it tolerably than
that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them,
not to win it for them."117
117. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, supra note 20, at 1-154.
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